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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
CONFLICT OF LAWS-REs JUDICATA-STATE'S DETERMINATION OF
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION MUST BE GIVEN FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT.
Durfee v. Duke (U.S. 1963)
A brought an action in a Nebraska state court to quiet title to land
situated in the Missouri River bottom, the status of which had been affected
by a shift in the Missouri-Nebraska boundary line which is formed by the
mid-stream of the Missouri River. The Nebraska Court had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the controversy only if the land in question were
in Nebraska. To determine that issue, the factual question of whether a
shift in the river's course had been caused by avulsion or accretion had to
be answered. B appeared in the Nebraska court and fully litigated the
issues, explicitly contesting the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The court found it had jurisdiction and quieted title in A. B appealed and
the Supreme Court of Nebraska' affirmed the judgment after a trial de novo
on the record made in the lower court. B did not petition the Supreme
Court of the United States, but instead brought an action two months later
in the Missouri court to quiet title to the same land. The suit was removed
to a federal district court by reason of diversity of citizenship. The district
this must be balanced against the possibility of the network holding back the
desirable stations and using them as leverage to force acceptance of this
undesirable package.
(3) If ABC is not using a must buy practice and in fact still uses a minimum
dollar requirement, whether this practice would be in violation of the antitrust
laws. Again, the reasonableness of such a requirement must be investigated.
If it is found to be a reasonable system more issues must be decided:
(a) What considerations should be taken into account in establishing the
minimum. It is clear that the cost of production of the program in
question would not alone be enough. There are various other factors
that must be taken into account. The complication that arises is that
some low budget programs are the most desirable and the networks
depend on the high price that they bring to overcome the deficit
caused by producing less desirable high budget programs, its public
service responsibilities, and other non-production costs. In deciding
this, the court must face the problem that in forcing the network to
destroy its package and to divide the stations, the desirability of their
product might be destroyed. Some advertisers might be interested
in exposure of their product and not specific stations so that destruc-
tion of this broad exposure might preclude the network from this
certain market.
(b) Whether the court should oversee the stations offered by the net-
work in this line-up.
(4) Whether the burden should be upon the network to come forth and show that
its minimum dollar requirement is reasonable or upon the advertiser to show
it to be unreasonable.
It can be seen that it would be necessary that all of these factors be taken into
consideration ard more evidence produced before a court can rightfully decide whether
this agreement was in violation of the Sherman Act. The decision rendered on this
motion cannot be considered as binding upon the court despite the unfortunate
implications arising from the language of the opinion. This opinion is limited to what
was actually decided: merely that these issues should be tried.
1. Durfee v. Keiffer, 168 Neb. 272,95 N.W.2d 618 (1959).
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court rendered judgment against B.2 The Eighth Circuit reversed,3 but
on certiorari the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court holding that the
issue had been adjudicated and that the judgment of the Nebraska court
was res judicata and binding upon the district court. Durfee v. Duke,
.U.S.. . . ..... 84 S.Ct. 242 (1963).
To implement the constitutional command of the full faith and credit
clause4 Congress has required that "judicial proceedings . . . shall have
the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ...
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which
they are taken."' The purpose of full faith and credit is to establish a
useful means for ending litigation between adverse parties. Once the
pleadings show that the issues of a case have been previously determined,
the adjudication is ended. Without full faith and credit, "adversaries could
wage again their legal battles whenever they met in other jurisdictions."
Every state is therefore required to give a judgment at least the res judicata
effect which the judgment would be accorded in the state which rendered
it, so that ". . . the local doctrines ,of res judicata, speaking generally,
become a part of national jurisprudence .... -"7 Since in the instant case
the Nebraska courts would give res judicata effect to the Nebraska judg-
ment, so must the federal court in Missouri.8
It was argued, however, that a judgment of a court in J-1 is conclusive
upon the merits in a court in J-2 only if the court in J-1 had the power
to pass on the merits, that is, had jurisdiction to render the judgment.9
The Court pointed out that, while it is established that a court in J-2 may
2. Duke v. Durfee, 215 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
3. Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962).
4. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceed-
ings shall be, proved, and the Effect thereof. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958). The progenitor of the present statute was enacted
by the First Congress in 1790. Rrv. STAT. § 905 (1875). "The Act extended the rule
of the Constitution to all Courts, Federal as well as State." Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813). Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40, 59 S.Ct. 3 (1938).
See Durfee v. Duke, 84 S.Ct. 242, 243 n.2 (1963).
6. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349, 62 S.Ct. 608, 612 (1942).
7. Ibid.
8. Durfee v. Duke, 84 S.Ct. 242, 244 n.6. The Nebraska Supreme Court has
clearly postulated the relevant law of the State:
This court adheres to the rule that if a court is one competent to decide
whether or not the facts in any given proceeding confer jurisdiction, decides that
it has jurisdiction, then its judgments entered within the scope of the subject
matter over which its authority extends in proceedings following the lawful
allegation of circumstances requiring the exercise of its jurisdiction, are not
subject to collateral attack but conclusive against all the world unless reversed on
appeal or avoided for, error or fraud in a direct proceeding. Brandeen v. Lau, 113
Neb. 34, 201 N.W. 665; Douglas County v. Feenan, 146 Neb. 156, 18 N.W. 2d
740, 159 A.L.R. 569. Gergen v. Western Union Life Ins. Co., 149 Neb. 203, 210,
30 N.W.2d 558, 562.
9. Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 469 (1874).
On the whole, we think it clear that the jurisdiction of the Court by which
a judgment is rendered in any State may be questioned in a collateral proceeding
in another State, notwithstanding the provision of the fourth article of the Con-
stitution and the law of 1790, and notwithstanding the averments contained in the
record of the Judgment itself.
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inquire into the jurisdiction of a J-1 judgment, modern decisions of the
Supreme Court'0 have delineated the permissible scope of such an inquiry.
As a general rule "a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit - even
as to questions of jurisdiction - when the second court's inquiry discloses
that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided
in the court which rendered the original judgment.""
In Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n,12 this principle
was established in respect to questions of jurisdiction over the person. Once
J-2 has discovered that the issue of personal jurisdiction has been litigated
in J-1, there is no need to proceed further and "public policy dictates that
there be an end of litigation.' u The Court reasoned that when one has
voluntarily appeared, presented his case and been fully heard, he should
not, in the absence of fraud, be able to challenge the judgment of the
tribunal to which he originally submitted his cause.
The extension of this general rule to include subject matter jurisdiction
is the precise issue of Durfee. The Court pointed out that this rule is
indeed applicable to questions involving jurisdiction over the subject
matter.14 Basically the Court concluded that although there may be differ-
ences between personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, the
doctrine of "one trial of an issue"' 5 applies. Upon the reasoning and the
cases cited, the Court held that once the issue has been fully litigated and
judicially determined, it cannot be retried in another state in alitigation
between the same parties. Collateral attack appears to have ended whenever
the same parties have previously argued the issue. But what if the issue
has not been argued?
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank'6 indicates that
the same result would be reached. Though not involving jurisdiction, but
collateral attack on the merits, the case establishes the proposition that if
an objection could have been raised in a prior hearing and was not, it
cannot be subsequently raised. In that case, bondholders of a state drainage
district had been parties to a proceeding under the Municipal Readjustment
10. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct. 1087 (1948) ; Treinies v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 60 S.Ct. 44 (1939) ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 59 S.Ct. 3(1938) ; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 S.Ct. 134 (1938) ; Baldwin v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 51 S.Ct. 517 (1931).
11. Durfee v. Duke, 84 S.Ct. 242, 245 (1963).
12. 283 U.S. 522, 51 S.Ct. 517 (1931).
13. Id. at 525-526, 51 S.Ct. at 518. "Public policy," said the Court:
[D] ictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an
issue shall be bound by the result of the contest; and that matters once tried shall
be considered forever settled as between the parties. We see no reason why this
doctrine should not apply in every case where one voluntarily appears, presents his
case and is fully heard, and why he should not, in the absence of fraud, be there-
after concluded by the judgment of the tribunal to which he has submitted his cause.
14. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct. 1087 (1948) ; Treinies v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 60 S.Ct. 44 (1939); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 59 S.Ct.
3 (1938) ; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 S.Ct. 134 (1938)
15. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517,
518 (1931).
16. 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317 (1940) (involving federal courts applying federal
law). See Rashid, The Full Faith and Credit Clause: Collateral Attack of Jurisdic-
tional Issues, 36 Gzo. L. Rbv. 154, 165 (1948).
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Act of 193417 for the readjustment of its indebtedness. In that first pro-
ceeding, the constitutionality of the statute was not questioned, but the
bondholders did not comply with the provisions of the decree for retirement
of their bonds within the limited time. Subsequent to the original proceed-
ing, the Supreme Court, in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improve-
ment Dist. No. 1,18 held the same statute unconstitutional as infringing
on the control of the states over their financial affairs. In the subsequent
action on their bonds, Chief Justice Hughes in his opinion indicated that
the bondholders had had an opportunity to present their objections in the
first proceeding, and to argue the validity of the statute under which the
action was brought. Having failed to do this, the parties were not privileged
to raise this question in a subsequent suit. The Court rested this decision
on the well-settled principle that "res judicata may be pleaded as a bar,
not only as respects matters actually presented to sustain or defeat the
right asserted in the earlier proceeding, 'but also as respects any other
available mafter which might have been presented to that end'." 19
Combine Durfee v. Duke with the Chicot County case and it appears
that the Supreme Court has accepted and reaffirmed the final step in the
dismemberment of the principle of collateral attack. Had the Durfee
opinion stopped at this point, possibly it would have stood for a strict,
unbending rule on the finality of jurisdictional determinations. The Court,
however, did not stop here, but specifically stated that there are exceptions
to this general rule.20 The Court pointed out that the doctrines of federal
pre-emption or sovereign immunity may in some contexts be controlling.
In Kalb v. Feuerstein,21 a judgment of foreclosure was entered in a
state court upon foreclosure proceedings instituted by defendants as mort-
gagees. The mortgagors had meanwhile been granted a petition in the
bankruptcy court pursuant to the Frasier-Lanke Act.22 Subsequently the
mortgagors commenced an action against the mortgagees for their fore-
closure and eviction. The defendants attempted to set up the foreclosure
judgment, which was not appealed, as res judicata to the mortgagors' action.
The Supreme Court held that the judgment was subject to collateral attack
on jurisdictional grounds by the defendant in that action when he later
filed a petition in bankruptcy in a federal court. Thus, the first exception
to the general rule was carved by the Court, interpreting Congress' mani-
fest intention in its bankruptcy legislation, to oust the state court of
jurisdiction in the foreclosure proceeding. In effect, the Court ruled that
so strong a congressional policy existed as to obviate the need for a direct
attack in the state court on its jurisdiction.
.17. 48 Stat. 798 (1934), 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1940).
18. 298 U.S. 513, 56 S.Ct. 892 (1936) (5-4 decision).
19. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 378, 60
S.Ct. 317, 320 (1940).
20. Durfee v. Duke, 84 S.Ct. 242, 246 (1963).
21. 308 U.S. 433, 60 S.Ct. 343 (1940).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 203 (1940).
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Another exception was pronounced in United States v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co.,2 3 where the Supreme Court held a judgment against the
United States on a cross-claim was subject to collateral attack on the
jurisdictional grounds of sovereign immunity. If collateral attack had not
been permitted, liability would have been imposed on certain Indian tribes
that supposedly had sovereign immunity from suit. In neither this case nor
Kalb had the jurisdictional issue been raised in J-1, although the vehement
language used by the Court in both cases seems to insinuate that collateral
attack would have been allowed24 even if it had been raised.
The Supreme Court seems to be formulating limitations to the total
abandonment of collateral attack. In so doing, the Court appears to be
balancing the highly-valued policy of ending litigation against the policy
of allowing a court to act beyond its jurisdiction. In effect the Court seems
to have adopted the Restatement25 approach to jurisdiction over the subject
matter. According to the Restatement, the rule is that, where a court
determines it has jurisdiction over the subject matter, it cannot be collater-
ally attacked on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction "unless
the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata is outweighed by the
policy against permitting the court to act beyond its jurisdiction."2 6 The
factors included as appropriate to the balancing of these two principles ar
noted below. 27 Although the Court and the Restatement appear to agree
on the general rule,28 the factors to be considered have not been explicitly
accepted by the Court. To what extent have these factors been implicitly
accepted? If this question could be directly and immediately answered there
would be no need to note this case. However, since it cannot, Durfee must
be used as a stepping stone in determining the limitations on the now
general rule that judgments cannot be collaterally attacked. Has the Court
re-enforced the sweeping rule laid down in the Chicot County case, thus
completing the dismemberment of collateral attack? Or has the Court
23. 309 U.S. 506, 60 S.Ct. 653 (1940).
24. Id. at 513, 60 S.Ct. at 657. ". . . this immunity cannot be waived by officials.
If the contrary were true, it would subject the government to suit in any court in the
discretion of the responsible officers."
Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 444, 60 S.Ct. 343, 348 (1940). "Congress
manifested its intention that the issue of jurisdiction in the foreclosing court need not
be contested or even raised by the distressed farmer-debtor."
25. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 451(2) (Supp. 1948). See RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS, § 10 (1942).
26. R STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 451(2) (Supp. 1948).
27. The factors are as follows:(a) the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was clear;
(b) the determination as to jurisdiction depended upon a question of law
rather than of fact;
(c) the court was one of limited and not of general jurisdiction;
(d) the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated;(e) the policy against the court's acting beyond its jurisdiction is strong.
Ibid.
28. In fact the Restatemettt accepted this rule after Davis, Stoll and Treinies.
RIESTATMENT, CONFLICT or LAWS, § 451, comment a (Supp. 1948). The American
Law Institute stated that no opinion was expressed on whether or how far a party
appearing and participating in the proceedings in one court could collaterally challenge
the jurisdiction of the subject matter of that court. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS,
§ 451, caveat (1942).
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used the factual situation in the instant case to open the door once more
to collateral attack? Since the Court did not allow collateral attack, it has
not directly opened the door; but the fact that the Court specifically stated
that there are exceptions to the rule of finality of jurisdictional determina-
tions in a case where the parties directly argued the subject matter
jurisdiction, leads one to believe that there may be situations where the
underlying reasons for collateral attack may outweigh the reasons supporting
res judicata, even where the parties have raised the issue in J-1.
In the instant case, the first four Restatement factors used to determine
the balance between collateral attack and finality of decisions on subject
matter jurisdiction are against an exception to res judicata. The lack of
jurisdiction of the Nebraska court is not particularly clear; the dispute
is almost entirely one of fact rather than of law ;29 the Nebraska courts
were courts of general jurisdiction; the jurisdictional question was fully
litigated. 30 This leaves among the stated factors only the fifth one resting on
policy. It is certainly the most significant, since it is not susceptible to pre-
cise limitations and leaves to the courts an extensive range for interpretation.
It was argued that, with respect to cases involving real property, the
rule of jurisdictional finality is overcome by the doctrine that courts of one
state are completely without jurisdiction to directly affect title to land in
other states.31 Therefore, when the courts of one state are directly and
adversely affected by another forum's determination of the situs of land
as between the two states, the J-2 court may inquire into the jurisdictional
grounds of the J-1 proceeding. However, since the Nebraska litigation is
not res judicata to an action brought by Missouri in the Supreme Court,32
there is no strong policy against upholding the rule against collateral
attack. This is especially true since the location of land, like the domicile
of a party to a divorce action, is a matter "to be resolved by judicial
determination. ' 33 Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court
and determined that there is no overriding policy to allow collateral attack
in Durfee, so that the instant case conforms directly with the Restatement.
29. "The parties are not in disagreement as to the law concerning the effect of
accretion and avulsion upon mid-channel state boundaries." Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d
209, 218 n.6 (8th Cir. 1962).
30. This factor is not necessarily determinative using the reasoning in the instant
case mentioned supra. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, § 10, comment c (1942).
31. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294 n.5, 63 S.Ct. 207,
211 (1942) ; Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U.S. 386, 30 S.Ct. 292 (1910) ; Fall v. Eastin,
215 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 3 (1909) ; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87, 105-106, 11 S.Ct.
960, 966 (1891). However, these cases are concerned with the full faith and credit
that must be given to extra-territorial in rem judgments of state courts.
32. See U.S. CoiqST. art. III, § 2. But such an action might prove lengthy and
costly. See Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11
STAN. L. Rxv. 665, 695 (1959). Also, a state's sovereignity, the validity of its land
titles, and its power to tax, can be affected, although indirectly, by proceedings of the
kind which have taken place in Durfee. Yet, an action by the state to determine the
boundary would limit the multiple suits that may arise since such a litigation will
determine the boundary of all the property along the river; and it will be binding in
all future private party suits.
33. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 349, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 1090 (1948).
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With the Restatement's reasoning as a basis, the courts will un-
doubtedly evolve numerous situations where the theory of res judicata
over the subject matter will be made inapplicable. It has been hypothesized
that the following situations will probably not be immune fr'om collateral
attack: (1) labor disputes, (2) naturalizations, (3) suits against the mili-
tary, (4) habeas corpus, and (5) cases of exclusive federal jurisdiction.3 4
An application and analysis of the Restatement factors to a hypothetical
situation provides a good means to explore the factors the court considers
to strike the balance between the policy of res judicata and the policy
against excessive judicial action.
Controversies touching on probate jurisdiction offer perhaps the most
interesting analysis since they commonly begin and often end with domicile.
At several points in the administration of an estate the decedent's domicile
gains crucial importance: "upon it may depend whether the will can be
probated under local statutes or even whether the will is valid, whether
personalty shall be distributed according to one law or another, whether a
particular state shall impose a death levy. '"35 This last point has gained in
importance since the advent of double domicile - now the terror of the
rich man.3 6 Where the exertion of state power is dependent upon domicile
within its boundaries, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the full
faith and credit clause require uniformity in the decisions.3 7
Under Virginia law 38 a will previously probated in another state is
admitted to probate, but is subject to attack on appeal. An authenticated
copy of a will probated in another state is no evidence in the Virginia
proceeding as to the validity of the execution of a will devising realty
in Virginia.3 9
To what extent does the doctrine of full faith and credit apply as
between the same litigants to the issue of domicile? If the non-resident
does not appear, he is not bound in another state.40 However, it is a
different case entirely if the non-resident appears and litigates the issue
of domicile. The strong policy against collateral attack would seem to
require full faith and credit. Similarly, it would appear from reading
Durfee that if a party had objected to the probation of a will in J-1, he
would then be prohibited from attacking the probate of the will in J-2.
However, it seems unlikely that the probate court would be required to
34. Boskey & Brauchen, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October Term, 1939,
40 COLUm. L. Rzv. 1006, 1013-30 (1940).
35. Id. at 1011.
36. See Tweed & Sargent, Death and Taxes Are Certain - But What of Domicile,
53 HARV. L. Rzv. 68 (1939).
37, Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299, 58 S.Ct. 185,
188 (1937).
38. VA. CoDP tit. 64, § 88 (1950).
39. Horn v. Horn, 195 Va. 912, 81 S.E.2d 593 (1954). Other states have similar
rules, however the refusal of the use of the J-1 probated will as any evidence in J-2
proceeding seems to be carried beyond its useful limits. See Note, 41 VA. L. Rlv.
279 (1955).
40. Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U.S. 162, 34 S.Ct. 299 (1914); Thormann v. Frame,
176 U.S. 350, 20 S.Ct. 446 (1900).
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